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Uzbekistan’s Balancing Act: A Game of Chance 
for Independent External Policies
Vadim Romashov
In Uzbekistan, like in the other countries in the region, the uncertainty related 
to the current developments in Afghanistan as well as the declarations of the 
U.S. on reforming the military mission there have affected the geopolitical 
environment and aroused speculation regarding the transformation and relo-
cation of the foreign military presence. Compounded by the increasing rival-
ry between the U.S. and Russia for regional influence, Uzbekistan’s main 
goal is to retain maximum independence in its external policies. Tashkent 
holds its foreign partners at a distance with divergent regional strategies 
whilst simultaneously keeping all avenues open for additional security guar-
antees in order to ensure stability at its state borders.
Since gaining independence in 1991, Uzbekistan’s external policy has 
been characterized by constant fluctuations in its relations with international 
actors who aim to project their political and economic power onto the region. 
Uzbek analysts traditionally share the view that the country pursues a “multi-
vector” policy, referring to this as “foreign policy pragmatism” or “foreign 
relations diversification.”1 Outside experts often describe Uzbekistan’s poli-
cy as one that “swings” between a close relationship with Moscow and the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and cooperation with Wash-
ington and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Such terms, no-
tably “pendulum diplomacy” or “zigzag policy,” have been applied repeated-
ly to describe frequent reorientations in the direction taken by Uzbekistani 
external policy.2 However, labeling Uzbekistan’s foreign policy in such ways 
                                                          
1 For example, see Adhamdjon Yunusov, Yakov Umansky and D. Zainutdinova, “National 
Interests and Pragmatism in the Foreign Policy of Uzbekistan,” in Building a Common Fu-
ture: Indian and Uzbek Perspectives on Security and Economic Issues, ed. P. Stobdan, 
(Delhi: Hardev Printers, 1999), 20–36; Rafik Saifulin, “How Myths Are Born: A View 
from Tashkent on the CSTO and Central Asia,” Russia in Global Affairs, no. 3 (July–
September 2012).
2 For examples of the use of the terms “swing,” “pendulum,” and “zigzag” see Jyotsna Bakh-
shi, “Russia and Uzbekistan Sign ‘Treaty of Alliance Relations’,” Institute for Defense 
Studies and Analyses Comment, December 27, 2005,
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has several serious conceptual limitations. This chapter aims to address the 
limitations of the “pendulum perspective” on Uzbekistani policies and em-
ploys another approach, which allows a better understanding of the complex 
relations Tashkent has with its foreign partners.
From physics we know that a pendulum-like motion implies moving to 
one direction with a synchronous departure from another, opposite direction 
and to which it must ultimately return. Applying this logic to Tashkent’s di-
plomacy, policy must constantly swing back and forth between the two sides, 
but in fact the external strategy of Uzbekistan is far more complicated than 
this logic implies. It may include simultaneously moving in both, seemingly 
opposite, directions and, thus, contraposing and superimposing one strategy 
over another. Moreover, an idealized model of the “geopolitical pendulum” 
commonly places Uzbekistani diplomacy in-between the two positions char-
acterized as pro-Russian and pro-U.S. directions. Such an approach based on 
the dualistic division of its policy orientation neglects the country’s im-
portant relations with China, Turkey, the European Union (EU), Iran, India, 
and other influential actors involved in the region’s politics.
A view of Tashkent’s foreign policy in the frame of the swinging pendu-
lum, however, presupposes that there is a period of time available in which to 
calculate policy reorientation. Thus, we may identify a predictivist perspec-
tive here, a belief in the possibility to forecast foreign policy transformations
with calculated certainty. This belief induces fallacious expectations of an 
inevitable, radical shift in Uzbekistani external strategy within a defined pe-
riod.3 In this way, the importance of chance, changing circumstances and 
situational junctures in foreign and domestic affairs is downplayed. The ana-
                                                                                                                            
http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/RussiaandUzbekistanSignTreatyofAllianceRelati
ons_jbakshi_271205; Nathan Hamm, “Uzbekistan Exit from CSTO Reveals Limits of Rus-
sia’s Eurasian Integration Plans,” E-International Relations, July 17, 2012, http://
www.e-ir.info/2012/07/17/uzbekistan-exit-from-csto-reveals-limits-of-russias-eurasian-
integration-plans/; Marlene Laruelle, “Factoring the Regional Impact of Uzbekistan’s
Withdrawal from the CSTO,” German Marshall Fund Policy Brief, August 2012, http://
www.gmfus.org/publications/factoring-regional-impact-uzbekistan%E2%80%99s-
withdrawal-csto; Farkhod Tolipov, “Flexibility or Strategic Confusion? Foreign Policy of 
Uzbekistan,” Uzbekistan Initiative Papers, no. 2 (February 2014), http://origin.library.
constantcontact.com/download/get/file/1110347635144-152/UI+papers+ht2-
Farkhad+Tolipov.pdf.
3 For instance, Murat Laumulin, a Kazakh researcher, estimates that the “Uzbek pendulum” 
swings every two to three years. See Laumulin, “Virtual Security of Central Asia: The 
CSTO in the face of NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan,” Russia in Global Affairs, no. 
3 (July–September 2012).
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lytical idea of a pendulum-like external policy mechanism can also affect 
strategic decision-making in the countries that are engaged in Central Asian 
politics. As a final point, such an approach does not answer the critical ques-
tions of why the policy pendulum oscillates and what would constitute its 
“equilibrium position.”
Taking into consideration the limitations of the pendulum approach, this 
chapter presents an alternative view of Uzbekistan’s external policy as a 
“balancing act” that essentially refers to balancing feats performed by a tight-
rope walker rather than to the realist concept of “balance of power.” From 
this perspective, the rope that is stretched taut above the ground appears to be 
the path to a given destination defined by the long-term goals of the coun-
try’s government, acting as a “tightrope walker,” which aims to position Uz-
bekistan as an independent and strong leader of Central Asia. The strategic 
track towards independence and leadership is seen as an equilibrium position 
of Uzbekistani policy, while a tumble from the tightrope would mean the loss 
of the country’s advantageous position in the region. Therefore, the fluctua-
tions of Tashkent’s foreign policy are not the swings of a pendulum but ra-
ther represent efforts to hold the strategic equilibrium. Similar to a tightrope 
walker, who by receiving inertia from many different directions holds onto 
the wire, Uzbekistan attempts to obtain political, military, and economic sup-
port from various international actors in order to secure its independence and 
leading position in the region. Obviously, the wider the amplitude is of the 
wire’s sway caused by circumstantial changes, the bigger the inclination of 
the ropewalker to that side that is able to provide better assistance in main-
taining the balance.
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the practices forming the pat-
tern in Uzbekistan’s balancing act. I argue that the drastic changes in the ex-
ternal and internal security environment cause the Uzbekistani strategic 
“rope” to sway and, thus, force the country’s leadership to lean in different 
foreign policy directions. Importantly, for Uzbekistan the changes represent 
both a chance to achieve an advantage in regional politics as well as the risks 
associated with subsequent actions taken by foreign and domestic forces as a 
reaction to the fluctuations of the country’s policy. Such a game of chance 
and risk played by the Uzbekistani government introduces an element of po-
litical gamble to state policies. The goal of this game is to implement inde-
pendence in a way that builds on an Uzbek tradition of power and historical 
past associated with the country’s previously central position in the region. 
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The revival of the past serves the present-day purpose of constructing a uni-
fied national identity in support of the state organization that has been 
formed under the long-lasting reign of President Islam Karimov.
Any examination of Uzbekistan’s relations with Russia must take into 
account Moscow’s indirect influence on strategic decision-making in Tash-
kent. Russia’s policy practices tend to exert specific influence on the policy 
practices of Uzbekistan through various spheres of the interaction between 
the two states, which recently has been affected by conflictual relations be-
tween Tashkent and the CSTO, the modification of Russia’s role in the secu-
rity system of Uzbekistan, and the emergence of Eurasian economic initia-
tives within the region. By focusing on regional security influenced by Mos-
cow-Tashkent relations, this chapter examines important internal-external 
dynamics in the formation and transformation of borders within and around 
Uzbekistan. It analyses official speeches, foreign and defense policy legisla-
tion, international agreements, and media and expert accounts. A broad range 
of sources is needed to alleviate the problem that characterizes research on 
Uzbekistan: limited access to a number of important Uzbekistani official 
documents, including the concepts of National Security and Foreign Policy
Activity.
“Eternal Independence” and the Balancing Act
Independence Day is a widely celebrated holiday in Uzbekistan, to which 
Islam Karimov devotes his long and emotionally colored speeches. At the 
celebration of the twenty-second anniversary of Uzbekistan’s independence 
in 2013, Karimov stated,
“[The] achievement of independence is precisely an opportunity to fulfill our 
great and sacred obligation, that is, to command our destinies and the fate of our 
country on our own, along with its natural, economic and intellectual resources… 
Independence means to be independent of anyone at any time, to secure sustain-
able growth rates of the economy, consistently boost the wellbeing of the popula-
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tion, and bolster the standing and prestige of our country at the international are-
na, taking into account our national interests and long-term objectives.”4
The idea of the country’s “eternal independence” for which Uzbek “forefa-
thers had strived for centuries” is a fundamental element of national ideolo-
gy, and state policy practices have been designed accordingly.5 Foreign poli-
cy is aimed at positioning Uzbekistan as a regional leader, independent from 
external influence in its decision-making. The country’s aspirations to re-
gional leadership are rooted in Central Asian history associated with the 
dominance of Uzbek tribal groupings in Transoxiana, the power of Uzbek 
khanates, and a special role assigned to the Uzbek SSR during Soviet rule. 
Neil Melvin observes that during the national delimitation process in 1924–
1925 held by Moscow planners, Uzbekistan gained the pre-eminent historic 
centers of the region, including most of the territory of the three former 
khanates, and Tashkent became the main city of Central Asia, all of which 
contributed to the further development of a strong Uzbek identity.6
The balance between the extra-regional powers anchoring influence in 
the region, primarily Russia, the U.S. and China, appears to be the way in 
which Uzbekistan realizes its long-term goals. While China’s sources of in-
fluence are based mostly on economic power, Moscow and Washington are 
deeply involved in security cooperation with Tashkent.7 Proceeding from the 
view that Russia and the U.S. are geopolitical rivals in the region, Tashkent 
avoids crossing “the point of no return” in its relations with them. The Uz-
bekistani leadership strives to keep all directions open as options for receiv-
ing security guarantees in case the political conjuncture were to develop in a 
way that would force Uzbekistan to affiliate itself with one of the centers of 
power in order to eliminate immediate security threats and to bargain for bet-
ter treatment from a powerful state or international organization. In the con-
text of the strategic goal to maximize political independence, third-party se-
                                                          
4 Islam Karimov, “Greeting Address at the Festive Event to Celebrate 22nd Anniversary of 
Uzbekistan’s Independence,” Press Service of the President of Uzbekistan, August 31, 
2013, http://www.press-service.uz/en/news/159/.
5 Ibid.
6 Neil Melvin, Uzbekistan: Transition to Authoritarianism on the Silk Road (Florence, KY: 
Gordon & Breach Publishing, 2000), 91.
7 Unlike Uzbekistan’s 2004 Strategic Partnership Agreement with Russia and the 2002 Dec-
laration on Strategic Partnership with the U.S., the 2012 Declaration on Strategic Part-
nership with China is less focused on security issues and instead concentrates on economic 
cooperation.
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curity guarantees mean a promise by an outside power to provide concrete 
resources and assistance in eliminating security threats, rather than an assur-
ance of direct military intervention to protect the state in situations of threat.
Since independence, the immediate policy objective of Uzbekistan has 
been to reduce Russian influence in Central Asia. However, the civil war in 
Tajikistan that erupted in 1992 between the central government and the Unit-
ed Tajik Opposition of Islamist and democratic forces, compelled Russia and
Uzbekistan to maintain security cooperation. Apprehensive of the spread of 
Islamic radicalism to Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov backed the pro-Russian 
forces of Emomali Rakhmonov (Rakhmon), who became the president of 
Tajikistan in November 1994. In order to neutralize the risks of a possible 
expansion of the Tajik war and rapidly escalating tensions in Afghanistan, 
the Uzbekistani leadership actively supported the idea of creating a collective 
security system with Russia. In May 1992, in Tashkent, Armenia, Kazakh-
stan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan signed the Collective 
Security Treaty (CST). As an additional security guarantee, in 1994 Russia 
and Uzbekistan concluded a military cooperation agreement, which involved 
among other issues the joint use of military facilities located on their territo-
ries. Thus, the shared interest of Russia and Uzbekistan in suppressing what 
was referred to as “Islamic extremism” provided the stimulus to preserve 
security ties between the two states.
In August 1998, the Taliban defeated the forces of Abdul Rashid Dos-
tum, the warlord of a separatist movement in the northern, Uzbek-populated 
region of Afghanistan, and proceeded to approach the Uzbekistani border. 
These events prompted Tashkent to conclude that relying solely on military 
ties with Russia was not sufficient to ensure state security, and contacts with 
the U.S. and NATO were activated. In April 1999, Uzbekistan refused to 
renew its membership in the CST and, at the NATO summit in Washington, 
announced its decision to join GUAM, a bloc of pro-Western post-Soviet 
states formed by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. However, in 
summer 1999 the security situation along Uzbekistan’s borders deteriorated 
and slowed down any rapprochement with Western countries: the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), created in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, 
attempted to infringe upon Uzbekistani territory by way of Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan. Increased danger at the borders brought Tashkent to realize that 
by severing close security ties with Russia this unstable situation could take a 
turn for the worse. Hence, in 1999, Moscow and Tashkent signed an accord 
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on the further enhancement of comprehensive military and military-technical 
cooperation. In May 2001, the two states concluded a cooperation agreement 
on border issues that covered the joint fight against terrorism, illegal migra-
tion, arms and drug trafficking, and the mutual exchange of information, lo-
gistical support, officer training, etc. In addition, later in 2001 the two states 
signed an agreement on the joint use of air forces and air defense systems.8
A chance for Uzbekistan to abandon its security dependence on Russia 
occurred following the 9/11 events in 2001. The International Security Assis-
tance Force (ISAF) began anti-Taliban military operations in Afghanistan, 
and Tashkent offered its support to the U.S. However, President Karimov 
underlined that in order to provide assistance to the anti-terrorist campaign,
Uzbekistan would need to have “guarantees of national security and territori-
al inviolability” and be able to “enhance the combat ability of the armed 
forces and the vigilance on borders.”9 In October 2001, Uzbekistan and the 
U.S. signed an agreement on the use of the Karshi-Khanabad airbase (K2) 
for military operations in Afghanistan and released a joint statement about 
consultations between both states in case of a threat occurring to Uzbeki-
stan’s security and territorial integrity. Based on this cooperation, in March 
2002 the two states signed a Declaration on Strategic Partnership and Coop-
eration. In exchange for the use of the airbase, the U.S. increased the budget-
ed assistance to Uzbekistan, especially in relation to the objective of “peace
and security enhancement.”10 According to Dmitry Gorenburg, military as-
sistance from Washington included two armored river patrol boats, radios, 
upgrades for helicopters, navigations systems, facilities renovations, and 
support in training. During the period 2001–2005, the U.S. and Uzbekistan 
                                                          
8 Sobranie zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, “Soglashenie mezhdu Rossiiskoi Feder-
atsiei i Respublikoi Uzbekistan o sovmestnom primenenii Voenno-vozdushnykh sil Rossi-
iskoi Federatsii i Voisk protivovozdushnoi oborony i Voenno-vozdushnykh sil Respubliki 
Uzbekistan v interesakh obespecheniia bezopasnosti vozdushnogo prostranstva Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii i Respubliki Uzbekistan,” Biulleten’ mezhdunarodnykh dogovorov, no. 6 (June 
23, 2005).
9 “Uzbekistan May Allow U.S. To Use Its Air Space for Humanitarian Flights,” Interfax,
September 27, 2001 as cit. in “Turkmen Report,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Sep-
tember 29, 2001, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1347103.html.
10 See Jim Nichol, “Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests,” Congressional 
Research Service, CRS Report, August 21, 2013, 24–25,
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21238.pdf.
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had a broad-scale military cooperation program, and Uzbekistani forces par-
ticipated in a number of NATO-led military exercises.11
In 2001, whilst trying to keep its foreign policy balanced, Uzbekistan 
joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Nevertheless, its ex-
ternal policy remained largely one-sided until the SCO summit of June 2004, 
held in Tashkent, when Uzbekistan made new attempts to balance its policy. 
The SCO adopted a decision to establish a Regional Antiterrorism Structure 
with headquarters in the capital city of Uzbekistan, and Islam Karimov 
signed a Strategic Partnership Treaty with Russia, which provided for close 
cooperation in creating “an enduring and effective system of regional securi-
ty in Central Asia.”12 The parties agreed to form consultative mechanisms 
through relevant ministries and agencies to fight terrorism. Once again, the 
terrorist threat was on the agenda: in spring 2004, reportedly, the Islamic 
Jihad Union, a splinter group of the IMU, perpetrated a series of bomb at-
tacks in Uzbekistan.13
In May 2005, the Andijon events suddenly swung Uzbekistan’s strategic 
path towards an independent policy. Western governments attacked Islam 
Karimov over the cruel suppression of riots and repeatedly called for an in-
ternational investigation into the incident; this was rejected by the president 
on the grounds that it would violate state sovereignty.14 The U.S. and EU 
restricted aid and arms exports to Uzbekistan as well as visas for Uzbek offi-
cials, and their assets were frozen. Tashkent turned to Russia and China for 
support. On a visit to Moscow in June 2005, Karimov accused Western 
countries of backing “extremist and radical forces” in Andijon,15 and shortly 
after Uzbekistan left GUAM. At an SCO meeting in July 2005, the president 
                                                          
11 Dmitry Gorenburg, “External Support for Central Asian Military and Security Forces,” 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Working Paper, January 2014, 52, 56, 
http://www.sipri.org/research/security/afghanistan/central-asia-security/publications/SIPRI-
OSFno1WP.pdf.
12 The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Dogovor o strategicheskom partnerstve mezhdu 
Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Respublikoi Uzbekistan,” 2004,
http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/spd_md.nsf/0/04545C3F32532D6DC3257DB9004735F1 (trans-
lation by Vadim Romashov).
13 Jim Nichol, “Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests,” 
Congressional Research Service, CRS Report, June 6, 2006, 8,
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/68821.pdf.
14 Nichol, “Uzbekistan,” 16–17.




of Uzbekistan joined in the declaration of the organization that called for the 
parties of the anti-terrorist coalition in Afghanistan to “set a deadline for the 
temporary use of… infrastructure facilities of the SCO member states and for 
their military presence in these countries.”16 Thereupon, Tashkent demanded 
that the U.S. withdraw all military units from the base in Karshi-Khanabad 
within six months, and in November 2005 the base was closed.
Under these changed circumstances, Tashkent needed to demonstrate to 
the Western states that the country could not be isolated within its borders 
from the rest of the world, and that it had other strategic partners that could 
help to ensure national security. In November 2005, Russia and Uzbekistan 
signed a Treaty of Alliance, which stipulates that 
“If an act of aggression is committed against one of the sides by any state or 
group of states, this will be viewed as an act of aggression against both sides….
the other side... will provide necessary assistance, including military assistance, 
as well as giving aid through other means at its disposal.”17
The Treaty called for consultations in the event of a security threat to either 
country and emphasized that the states were to pursue the enhancement of 
stability and security at global and regional levels.18 Furthermore, in January 
2006 Uzbekistan joined the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) and, 
in May of that year, Karimov announced the country’s accession to the 
CSTO. The accelerated deepening of Russian-Uzbekistani military-political 
cooperation must be seen as an attempt by the government in Tashkent to 
receive inertia from the Russian side in order to keep its balance on the oscil-
lating “strategic wire.” The aim of the Uzbek policy-makers was to induce a 
change in the attitude of Western states so that they would recognize Uzbeki-
stan as an independent regional power.
Contacts between Uzbek and U.S. officials resumed by 2007, and at the 
end of 2008 Western countries started to soften sanctions on the Uzbekistani 
government. In turn, U.S. military personnel received permission to transit 
through the Termez airbase near the Afghan border (leased to Germany) and 
to use the Navoi airport for transportation of non-lethal goods to Afghani-
stan. In 2009, Washington restarted military cooperation with Uzbekistan in 
                                                          
16 Cit. as in Nichol, “Central Asia,” 15.
17 Cit. as in Bakhshi, “Russia and Uzbekistan.”
18 The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Dogovor o soiuznicheskikh otnosheniiakh 
mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Respublikoi Uzbekistan,” 2005,
http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/spd_md.nsf/0/72EF98B3AEF0CDC9C3257DB90047370E. 
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the field of military education and training, and initiated Annual inter-
governmental Bilateral Consultations (ABC), which have significantly im-
proved security cooperation and boosted high-level official contacts between 
the two states.19 Uzbekistan assumed a central role in the Northern Distribu-
tion Network for non-lethal military supplies to Afghanistan. In parallel with 
the restoration of Uzbekistan’s relations with Western states, and as a part of 
the balancing act, its cooperation with Russia was curtailed. In November 
2008, the country’s officials announced the suspension of their participation 
in the EurAsEC. However, Uzbekistan’s formal commitments within CSTO 
were still hindering the reinforcement of a pro-Western direction, which at 
that time was seen in Tashkent as a way to achieve a position of regional 
leadership and independence from Moscow. Therefore, the Uzbekistani poli-
cy of balancing acts required further steps to expand the space for independ-
ent external relations.
The Policy toward Multilateral Cooperation and Russia’s 
Response
The strategic goal of Uzbekistan to achieve “eternal independence” is mani-
fest in policy practices aimed to distance the state from multilateral formats 
of any deeper international integration. In 2011, Islam Karimov stated,
“When it comes to the formation of various inter-state associations, it is possible 
that they will go beyond economic interests and gain political color and content,
which in turn may adversely affect the already established contacts and coopera-
tion of the members of the association with other external partners, the develop-
ment of integration processes with third-party countries.”20
Following this guideline, Uzbekistan assumed nominal participation in the 
CSTO yet left aside any substantive engagement with the organization. Uz-
bekistan did not take part in the CSTO military exercises, it opposed the 
creation of the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces, and finally, on June 28, 
                                                          
19 See Nichol, “Uzbekistan,” 18–20; and Gorenburg, “Central Asian Military and Security 
Forces,” 62.
20 Islam Karimov, “Doklad na torzhestvennom sobranii, posviashchennom 19-letiiu Konsti-
tutsii Respubliki Uzbekistan,” Press Service of the President of Uzbekistan, December 7, 
2011, http://www.press-service.uz/ru/news/4913/ (translation by Vadim Romashov).
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2012, the CSTO Secretariat received the official note from Uzbekistani au-
thorities regarding their decision to suspend participation in the organization. 
It is not accidental that Tashkent sent the official note two weeks after the 
Uzbek and Russian presidents signed a Declaration on the Further Consolida-
tion of Strategic Partnership and a Memorandum of Understanding on 
Measures for Uzbekistan’s Accession to the CIS (Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States) Free Trade Zone Agreement. The signature of the documents 
and the decision to suspend its participation in the CSTO testify to the inten-
tion of the Uzbekistani government to switch to bilateral relations with Rus-
sia and to participate only in those inter-state integration associations that do 
not imply close political engagement but do bring economic benefits.
However, an unidentified “source from Uzbekistani Foreign Ministry” 
explained this decision to the Russian media by referring to Tashkent’s disa-
greement with the CSTO’s strategic plans towards Afghanistan, which imply 
a joint approach to relations with that country.21 Islam Karimov repeatedly 
underlined the irreplaceable nature of bilateral relations with Kabul. At the 
September 2014 SCO summit he stressed that “Uzbekistan builds and will 
continue to build steady and friendly relations with Afghanistan deriving 
from the national interests of both countries and exclusively on [a] bilateral 
basis.”22 A bilateral relationship with Afghanistan, as opposed to a unified 
policy within an inter-state alliance, widens Tashkent’s maneuvering room 
for cooperation with different foreign partners.
The decision by Uzbekistan to suspend participation in the CSTO trig-
gered guesswork in the Russian media and the expert community on the real 
motives behind this policy action. Most accounts immediately speculated that 
Tashkent had bargained for certain security guarantees from Washington. 
Increased political contacts between Uzbek and American officials were pre-
sented in support of this conjecture.23 Some experts assumed that Tashkent 
and Washington were discussing the possibility of the resumption of a U.S. 
military presence in the country in exchange for excess military equipment 
from Afghanistan, including the return of the military base to Karshi-
Khanabad or, alternatively, the substitution of German troops in Termez by 
                                                          
21 Gennadii Sysoev, Elena Chernenko, and Maksim Iusin, “Uzbekistan otryvaetsia ot kollek-
tivnoi,” Kommersant, June 29, 2012, 6.
22 Islam Karimov, “Speech at the SCO Summit,” Press Service of the President of Uzbekistan,
September 12, 2014, http://www.press-service.uz/en/news/5005/.
23 “Uzbekistan poluchit garantii bezopasnosti ot SShA, schitaiut eksperty,” RIA, June 29, 
2012, http://ria.ru/world/20120629/687946170.html.
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U.S. forces.24 At the same time, Uzbekistan was portrayed as a troublesome 
member of the CSTO, an “enfant terrible,” as a Kazakh analyst had it, mean-
ing that it had been problematic for the CSTO participants to conduct con-
structive dialogue with Tashkent regarding the deepening of security integra-
tion and enhancement of the organization’s functionality and efficiency.25
The General Secretary of CSTO, Nikolai Bordiuzha, reasoned that Uzbeki-
stan’s decision had arisen from the country’s divergent views on the for-
mation of a system of collective security, which had led to difficulties of co-
operation within the organization itself. At the same time, the “Gen Sec” ad-
mitted that it would be challenging to build “the most effective” system of 
collective security in Central Asia without Uzbekistan, and he added that 
Tashkent would not be able to form its national security goals without the 
participation of the CSTO members.26
In order to decrease oscillations caused by the growing speculative en-
thusiasm of the Russian media and the expert community, as well as the an-
noyance of the political elite in Moscow, at the end of August 2012 the Sen-
ate (the upper chamber of Uzbekistan’s Parliament) adopted a Concept of 
Foreign Policy Activity. The Concept proclaims that Uzbekistan is free to 
join any inter-state organization but reserves the right to withdraw in case 
that organization becomes a military-political bloc. This principle was al-
ready enshrined in the 1992 Law on Defense and in the 1996 Law on Main 
Principles of Foreign Policy Activity. The 2012 Foreign Policy Concept re-
placed the 1996 Law on Foreign Policy Main Principles and made significant 
amendments to the 1995 Military Doctrine, which ruled out any participation 
of Uzbekistani forces in international peacekeeping operations. Presenting 
the concept to the Senate, Abdulaziz Kamilov, Foreign Minister of Uzbeki-
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stan, stressed that “the Uzbek soldiers would never fight in foreign coun-
tries.” 27
The main provision of the Concept, which aims to reassure Moscow of 
Tashkent’s reliability as a strategic partner and an ally of Russia, states that 
Uzbekistan does not allow the deployment of foreign military bases and fa-
cilities on its territory. However, there are many nuances in the document 
that allude to the continuing balancing act. The real engagement of Uzbeki-
stan with the principle of the non-deployment of foreign military on its terri-
tory is questionable, as the adoption of the Concept did not affect the German 
airbase in Termez. Moreover, the document does not ban access to the coun-
try’s military facilities and, in fact, Uzbekistan may allow other foreign 
troops to use its own infrastructure.
By adopting the Concept, Tashkent aimed to demonstrate that it does not 
intend to engage closely in terms of military and political cooperation with 
NATO and the U.S., and neither with the CSTO and Russia. Additionally, 
the document casts a shadow on Uzbekistan’s commitments under the Treaty 
of Alliance with Russia. In particular, the commitment to mutual support in 
case of aggression against one of the parties is called into question. One of its 
important components, military assistance, is limited by the Concept’s provi-
sion of non-participation of Uzbekistani soldiers in operations abroad. How-
ever, Uzbekistan has not declared neutrality and has thus left room for politi-
cal maneuvering with its international partners. To emphasize the independ-
ence of Uzbekistan from foreign actors, the Concept states that “no integra-
tion should be imposed from the outside” and “problems in Central Asia 
should be solved by the states in the region without interference from exter-
nal forces.” 28
Thus, the adoption of the foreign policy concept closed the door that had 
previously been left ajar following the notification of suspension of participa-
tion in the CSTO. The member states of the security organization decided not 
to accept the conduct of their “enfant terrible” and locked the door shut. In-
stead of upholding Tashkent’s wish to suspend its participation only, the 
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Council of Collective Security adopted a decision at the CSTO summit on 
December 19, 2012 to suspend Uzbekistan’s membership entirely. In this 
way the member states deprived Tashkent of the right to use the capacity of 
the system of collective security in case of security crises and to participate 
in the organization’s decision-making process. The Council laid down a key 
condition for Uzbekistan’s possible return: Tashkent would have to sign and 
ratify all the international agreements and decisions adopted under the 
CSTO.29
The transformations of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy in 2012 signal the 
country’s return to the strategic path toward an independent policy of being a 
regional leader and, through this, a pivotal actor in Central Asia. The imme-
diate motivation for the decision to leave the CSTO was the maximization of 
gains from relations with Western countries, who had announced the with-
drawal of their troops from Afghanistan and expressed an intention to gift 
surplus military equipment to Central Asian countries. Therefore, Tashkent 
has striven to demonstrate that NATO and the U.S. remain better security 
providers for the border between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan than are the 
CSTO and Russia, and has inclined towards negotiating security guarantees 
primarily with Washington. However, in this situation Uzbekistan risks un-
dermining its strategic relations with Russia and departing from its policy of 
balancing act.
Threats to National Security and Regional Stability
Along with a chance for gaining the advantage in regional politics sought by 
the Uzbekistani leadership, the reorganization of the U.S. military presence 
in Afghanistan brings with it risks for national security. Tashkent often draws 
attention to its anxiety that the withdrawal of Western troops from Afghani-
stan will result in deterioration of the security environment along Uzbeki-
stan’s borders. At the SCO summit in September 2014, Islam Karimov 
warned,
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“[T]he withdrawal of international security assistance forces from Afghanistan 
can lead to mounting threats and growing instability, expanding terrorist and ex-
tremist activities as well as increasing scales of drug trafficking not merely in the 
wider Central Asian region, but also far beyond its rims… [A]ny vacuum emer-
gent in Afghanistan can within a short period of time be filled by various de-
structive and terrorist groups.”30
However, Uzbekistan is not overly concerned about its own 137-kilometer-
long border with Afghanistan, the shortest Afghan border amongst the Cen-
tral Asian states. The frontier is well secured by the Uzbekistani military with 
heavy arms and a border barrier with two barbed wire lines (one of which is 
electrified) and landmines, which was erected by Tashkent after the Taliban 
victories in Afghanistan. The presence of the German airbase in Termez and 
a natural barrier, the Amu Darya River that separates the two states, also con-
tribute to border protection. The only bridge across the river can be closed at 
any time if danger arises from the southern neighbor, just as was the case in 
the period of 1996–2002. Simultaneously, the heavy security at the border is 
not conducive to building relationships of trust between local people and au-
thorities on the two banks of the Amu Darya. The Uzbek population is nu-
merically prevalent in the northern districts of Afghanistan, but the cross-
border flows of people are substantially restricted. Moreover, Uzbekistani 
authorities commonly present the frequent border incidents that result in ci-
vilian deaths as terrorist attacks and infiltration.31
The state border with Afghanistan is not the only border to create con-
cern for the Uzbekistani government. In the Central Asian context, the words 
“Afghan border” do not mean merely any particular country’s national bor-
der with Afghanistan but also carry the connotation of the former Soviet Af-
ghan border. The general expectation is that the security threat emerging af-
ter the military withdrawal of ISAF may reach the territory of every single 
Central Asian republic. Uzbekistan’s geographic location in the middle of 
Central Asia with its apparent strategic and economic advantages also creates 
specific security challenges for Tashkent. In light of this threat, the Uzbeki-
stani government considers its frontiers with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan as its 
“secondary Afghan borders.” According to Christian Bleuer and Said Reza 
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Kazemi, such a perception, coupled with the belief that its neighbors are not 
able to prevent incursions of “militants and terrorists” through their territory 
and into Uzbekistan, reinforces the conviction of the necessity to maintain 
heavy security measures at the Tajik and Kyrgyz borders.32 In effect this in-
creases distrust (high as it is already) between Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks, 
and adds to the instability at their joint borders; and the conflict-ridden rela-
tions between these neighboring states play into the hands of those termed 
“extremists.”
In the recent past, the main territorial target for the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan has been the Ferghana Valley, which is situated in the immediate 
vicinity of Tashkent, the center of Uzbek power. The instability at the cross-
roads of the three countries of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan can 
undermine security and the political situation in the entire Central Asian re-
gion. Besides this region with its troublesome reputation, there is a threat that 
a new channel for the infiltration of insurgents into Uzbekistan’s territory 
might occur through the Afghan-Turkmen border. Since 2013, the Taliban 
and its allies have intensified their activity in Afghan provinces adjacent to 
Turkmenistan. Some areas were temporally taken in the province of Faryab, 
and in Badghis province a group of gunmen stormed the border checkpoint.33
In February and May 2014, militants from these two provinces, reportedly of 
Turkmen and Uzbek ethnic origin, crossed the border and attacked Turkmen-
istan’s border guards.34 In comparison with the Afghan borders of Uzbeki-
stan and Tajikistan, the Afghan-Turkmen border is poorly defended. Tash-
kent pays considerably less attention to the border with Turkmenistan than it 
does to its turbulent frontiers with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. As a conse-
quence, the IMU and other insurgent groups could be in a position to use the 
Afghanistan–Turkmenistan channel to intrude into Uzbekistan’s territory.
Related to these developments, the crisis in Ukraine that began in late 
2013 also poses a threat to Tashkent’s authority. The domestic opposition 
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and external actors have received a stimulus for their actions taken in re-
sponse to Uzbekistan’s policy practices. In spring 2014, along with the de-
velopments in Crimea, the activity of a little-known movement “Alga Kara-
kalpakstan” fighting for the independence of Karakalpakstan, an autonomous 
republic in Uzbekistan, suddenly increased. The Alga Karakalpakstan activ-
ists held several protests urging the exercising the republic’s constitutional 
right to organize a referendum on secession from Uzbekistan. The activists 
called for Moscow to support their aspirations and even to admit Kara-
kalpakstan to the Russian Federation in spite of the absence of common bor-
der. The pro-Karakalpakstan activists made similar requests to neighboring 
Kazakhstan on the basis of the argument that it is the Kazakh language which 
is closest to Karakalpak. Such appeals have been backed by references to the 
history of Karakalpakia.35 The leaders of Alga Karakalpakstan emphasize 
that accession to Russia or Kazakhstan is not a goal in itself but instead a 
possible way “to protect the sovereignty and the future development” of 
Karakalpakstan.36 Even though the strength and viability of this movement 
remains unknown, the Karakalpak precedent may trigger centrifugal tenden-
cies also in Bukhara and Samarkand, Uzbekistan’s cities with large Tajik 
populations and historically significant for Tajik identity. Furthermore, 
Karakalpakstan is the site of the “Jaslyk” prison, which houses many inmates 
allegedly jailed for crimes related to outlawed Islamic organizations, mainly 
from Hizb ut-Tahrir but also from the IMU. Although the Islamic radicals in 
the Karakalpak opposition for the time being form only a small group num-
bering around 50 people based mostly in Kazakhstan and partly in Kara-
kalpakstan,37 the prison might represent a particular interest for radical Is-
lamists to “liberate” their associates. There is no reliable information on links 
with terrorist groups from Afghanistan, but members of the IMU and other 
Islamist radical organizations may attempt to infiltrate Karakalpakstan 
through Turkmenistan in order to manipulate potential separatist aspirations, 
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destabilize the situation, and undermine the authority of the government in 
Tashkent.
The Ukrainian developments in 2013–2014 have also inspired Uzbeki-
stan’s political opposition, in particular the People’s Movement of Uzbeki-
stan (PMU), which in February 2014 called for the use of arms to unseat 
President Karimov.38 The leader of the Movement, Muhammad Salih, resides 
in Turkey, and, as his representatives do not fail to mention, Karimov is con-
cerned about the possibility that Istanbul could provide political and financial 
support to the PMU.39 Such concerns were linked with the country’s presi-
dential election in 2015, in which Karimov was re-elected despite rumors 
that the aging incumbent would not participate in the election and was 
searching for possible successors.40 However, as experts note, the moment of 
power transition from 77-year-old Islam Karimov is inevitably approaching 
and this heightens internal risks notwithstanding his re-election to the presi-
dential office.41
In order to ensure stability inside the country and at its borders, Tashkent 
expects security guarantees primarily from Washington because, amongst 
other issues, these guarantees may involve the delivery of military hardware 
from Afghanistan through the Excess Defense Articles program. Uzbeki-
stan’s military equipment is mostly of Soviet origin and, unlike in Kazakh-
stan, it has not undergone extensive modernization.42 Despite the fact that the 
Uzbekistani army appears quite capable of suppressing opposition unrest and 
of fighting against small groups of Islamist insurgents, the condition of its 
hardware is unworthy of a country that purports to be a regional leader. From 
this point of view, Tashkent seeks high military capability for the improve-
ment of its political position in the negotiations over water issues and border 
conflicts with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and the strengthening of its position 
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in relation to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan’s main regional competitor. Therefore, 
receiving even second-hand NATO equipment is a better option for Tashkent 
than the continued use of obsolete Soviet arms, the maintenance of which 
contributes to preserve Uzbekistan’s dependence on Russia’s technical ser-
vice and supply of components.
In 2012, Moscow decided to provide unprecedented direct military-
technical aid to Kyrgyzstan worth $1.1 billion as well as $200 million for the 
Tajik army, including aviation, armored vehicles, artillery, air defense weap-
ons and small arms.43 This decision points to Russia’s response to the in-
creased military cooperation between Washington and Tashkent and an at-
tempt to restrain Uzbekistan’s conduct toward its neighbors. The increasing 
dependence of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan on Russian military supplies sub-
stantially reduces U.S. influence in these countries, and the simultaneous 
prolongation of the lease contracts for Russian military bases in Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan (for twenty and for thirty years, respectively) further consoli-
dates Russian presence in the region. In autumn 2012, Moscow also made an 
effort to outbid the U.S. for a possible military deal with Uzbekistan and 
signed a bilateral program with Tashkent on arms supplies until 2020. At the 
time of writing, details on the implementation of this program remain una-
vailable.
Despite these Russian actions, Uzbekistan and the U.S. have continued 
to intensify their military cooperation. In March 2013, NATO redeployed its 
Central Asian Liaison office from Astana to Tashkent. Although the organi-
zation’s representatives asserted that the redeployment is part of a regular 
regional rotation process, it raised a new wave of speculations about the fu-
ture development of the office into a military structure.44 No matter what the 
real motive is for this, the move indicates that NATO is not going to leave 
the region. In May 2014, following the official opening of the office, James 
Appathurai, the NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for the 
Caucasus and Central Asia, stated that “curtailing of combat units in neigh-
boring Afghanistan does not mean the end of cooperation with the countries
of the region” and added that “just a small change in the mission will hap-
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pen.” Appathurai promised assistance to Uzbekistan in its military reforms, 
which include the modernization of military institutions, defense structures, 
and military training.45
The trend of increased military cooperation between the U.S. and Uzbek-
istan has cemented the conviction in Russian expert opinion that Washington 
plans to reset its military presence in Uzbekistan.46 However, the transfer of 
Western excess military equipment to Uzbekistan is still unspecified, and 
Tashkent continues to maintain its military cooperation with Russia. In De-
cember 2014 at a meeting with President Vladimir Putin, Islam Karimov un-
derscored that Tashkent “supports a systematic and active expansion of con-
tacts in this strategically important area for full and effective implementation 
of the adopted long-term intergovernmental agreements and programs.” He 
explained this position due to “serious security threats, unpredictable situa-
tion in Afghanistan after the upcoming withdrawal of ISAF peacekeeping 
forces, the increasing scale of terrorism and drug trafficking, and […] creep-
ing expansion of militant extremism and religious radicalism.”47
The intentions of the U.S. and Russia to enhance military cooperation 
with Uzbekistan reveal that Uzbekistan remains their important strategic 
partner in Central Asia. However, the future format of the rival powers’ mili-
tary presence in Uzbekistan depends on Tashkent’s decision on how to coun-
ter the threats to its national security and the attacks on its authority within 
the state. These risks are concomitant to the gamble for wider political inde-
pendence, which Uzbekistan actively engages in by balancing between the 
extra-regional powers whilst the international military presence in Afghani-
stan is undergoing reorganization.
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“Triumvirate” Politics and the Eurasian Detour Around 
Uzbekistan
Russia’s attempts to involve Uzbekistan in the Eurasian integration projects 
following the rupture of Tashkent’s relations with Western states after the 
2005 Andijon events have not succeeded. The choice of the Uzbekistani 
government to favor bilateral relations instead of multilateral formats of co-
operation is not ultimately to Moscow’s liking because of the low engage-
ment it achieves in integration initiatives. Moreover, Uzbekistan continues its 
traditional policy towards the neighboring states, above all in regard to Kyr-
gyzstan and Tajikistan, from the position of strength, which takes full ad-
vantage of its central location in the region. In disputes with its neighbors, 
Tashkent from time to time employs energy and transport blockades as poli-
cy instruments in order to demonstrate its dominant position. Nevertheless, if 
the security situation requires support from the Russian side, or if there is a 
need to balance policies, Uzbekistan is willing to normalize relations with 
Moscow’s Central Asian allies. This foreign policy conduct is not merely a 
manifestation of Uzbekistan’s balancing act; it also stems from its identity as 
a regional leader. Against the background of Uzbekistan’s history, it is even 
possible to argue that the attitudes to its neighbors, which change from exert-
ing pressure to expressing benevolence, reflect something of the practices of 
the khans’ relations with their vassals.
However, the Uzbekistani leadership has a different attitude to Kazakh-
stan and sees it as a strong state that can be an equal partner. Taking into ac-
count this view of Tashkent, Russian and Kazakh experts promote the idea of 
a “triumvirate,” in other words the trilateral cooperation of Russia, Kazakh-
stan and Uzbekistan. Trilateral cooperation would grant a “privileged” status 
to Uzbekistan as a regional leader on a par with Russia and Kazakhstan. The 
“triumvirate” is supposed to be based on Russia’s comprehensive bilateral 
relations with the two regional leaders as well as the strategic bilateral coop-
eration between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and complemented by coopera-
tion in the frame of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).48 In June 2013, 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan took the first political step in this direction by 
signing an agreement on strategic partnership that brings closer Kazakhstani-
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Uzbekistani and Russian-Uzbekistani cooperation. At a December 2014 
meeting of Putin and Karimov, it was announced that the parties discussed 
the possibility of signing an agreement on a free trade zone between the EEU 
and Uzbekistan.49
Alexander Knyazev, a Russian expert on Central Asia, believes that the
scheme of trilateral cooperation will contribute to regional security as a 
common strategy of the three major states in addressing threats, primarily 
those related to the developments in Afghanistan.50 However, the intensified 
Uzbekistani-U.S. military-political dialogue does not strengthen confident 
relations between Moscow and Tashkent, which are necessary for the crea-
tion of a sustained trilateral structure of security cooperation. Therefore, the 
Russian government is developing an alternative approach in its relationship 
with Uzbekistan, an approach that potentially brings considerable risks for 
Tashkent’s leadership aspirations in the region. It implies setting up a detour 
around Uzbekistan in order to substantially decrease the dependence of Rus-
sia and its allies on this country as the main transit territory and energy sup-
plier.
Uzbekistan is the sole gas exporter to Tajikistan and the south of Kyr-
gyzstan, and this arrangement provides Tashkent with powerful leverage that 
backs its position in territorial and water disputes with the neighboring states.
Tajikistan has not received gas from Uzbekistan since late 2012. In April 
2014, the Uzbekistani gas transit company UzTransGaz cut off supplies to 
Kyrgyzstan. In addition to the political motives to apply pressure to the Kyr-
gyzstani and Tajikistani governments, there are economic reasons for sus-
pending supplies. A variety of problems related to the exploration and devel-
opment of gas fields as well as growing domestic demand limit the export 
potential of Uzbekistan. Moreover, part of the resources are consumed for 
developing the Turkmenistan–China gas pipeline system. In order to secure a 
share in the strategically important and profitable Chinese energy market, 
Uzbekistan has to provide the pipeline with gas almost at maximum capacity 
and at the expense of traditional customers.
Tashkent’s position in regional energy politics has left Moscow with 
both the opportunities and the need to organize gas deliveries to southern 
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Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Gazprom has allocated 65 billion rubles to con-
struct the gas pipeline connecting the north and south of Kyrgyzstan by the 
year 2016. In order to provide the Osh region, which is completely deprived 
of gas, with alternative energy sources before this date, the gas company has 
earmarked 20 billion rubles as a soft loan to the Kyrgyzstani Ministry of En-
ergy.51 In December 2014, the president of Kyrgyzstan, Almazbek Atamba-
yev, announced that there is also an agreement with Gazprom on the con-
struction of a gas pipeline from a gas field in Batken province to the Osh and 
Jalal-Abad provinces.52 In order to substitute gas imports in Tajikistan, the 
company plans to start gas production at the Sarykamysh field near Dushan-
be and to exploit resources from the Western Shaambary field.53 Moreover, 
the fourth line of the aforementioned gas pipeline to China is planned to run 
via Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which would allow both Central Asian coun-
tries to purchase Turkmen resources directly from the pipe. Eventually, 
Tashkent may lose the “gas cudgel” that it traditionally has employed toward 
Dushanbe and Bishkek.
Tashkent plays an important role also in the regional electricity distribu-
tion network due to the fact that most of the transmission facilities of the 
Central Asian Power System (CAPS), including its dispatch center and per-
sonnel, are placed in Uzbekistan. During the Soviet period, the CAPS was a 
key mechanism that united Central Asian republics within an integrated sys-
tem of redistribution of water and energy. When relations became market-
based following the dissolution of the USSR, Tashkent gained additional 
leverage with its neighbor states. The parties are frequently unable to finalize 
contracts on electricity transit and, as a result, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan suf-
fer from energy shortages in winter. Kazakhstan is in a better position be-
cause transmission in the northern parts of the country operates in parallel 
with the Russian Unified Power System (UPS) and it is only the southern 
regions that depend on CAPS. In 2003, Turkmenistan disconnected the na-
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tional transmission grid from CAPS and managed to create a separate power 
grid.
In June 2014, Tajik state energy company Barki Tojik announced that 
Astana, Bishkek and Dushanbe plan to revive CAPS without the involvement 
of Uzbekistan.54 For the first time the idea of connecting Tajikistan and Kyr-
gyzstan’s South to the joint power grid of Kazakhstan and northern Kyrgyz-
stan was officially announced in 2010.55 In 2013, this idea gained additional 
momentum when Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia decided to create a com-
mon energy market within the EEU.56 The initiative implies the deeper inte-
gration of national energy systems and the joint export of electricity to the 
power grids of other countries. In this situation, it is essential for Kazakhstan 
to detach itself from the unstable operation of CAPS, which provides Tash-
kent with a central role, and to connect Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to the 
common energy market. Participation in this will be profitable for Kyrgyz-
stani and Tajikistani hydroelectric power stations, which produce surplus 
electricity in summer. If these plans are realized, Uzbekistan’s leverage de-
riving from its advantageous position as the dispatch center of CAPS could 
turn into leverage for its neighbors, who by creating an independent electrici-
ty grid would become able to control water discharge according to their own 
needs.
The construction of a transmission line from Khujand in Tajikistan to 
Datka in Kyrgyzstan is part of the U.S.-initiated CASA-1000 project.57 Its 
extension to Shymkent in Kazakhstan (as a part of the Kazakh-Kyrgyz-Tajik 
UPS) would connect the CASA-1000 project with the EEU market. Like this, 
a large energy market could be formed that would limit Uzbekistan’s partici-
pation and reduce the influence of the U.S. Against the backdrop of this pos-
sibility it can be understood why, in 2011, Russia radically changed its atti-
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tude to CASA-1000 (from opposing the project to supporting it) and pro-
posed $500 million as investments to build the Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan line.58
Tashkent has been against the CASA project and believes that it is directly 
related to the construction of giant hydropower plants (HPP) in Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan.59 Being a downstream country, Uzbekistan has concerns 
that the power plants will create a mechanism that “will enable its owner to 
dictate unilaterally the harsh terms of water discharge to downstream coun-
tries,” and “this mechanism can be converted into explicit tool of political 
pressure.” 60
In fact, “the owner of the mechanism” to which Tashkent refers is not 
Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan but rather the Russian state-run companies. In 2012, 
the Russian and Kyrgyz governments signed agreements on building and 
operating Kambaratinskaya-1 and the Upper Naryn Cascade HPP. Since the 
Russian side finances the projects, parts of Kyrgyz shares in the joint organi-
zations created for operational management of the projects are transferred to 
the Russian founder companies or the financing organizations. The Russian 
side is authorized to conduct strategic and operational management of the 
projects for the period of payback and the return of borrowed funds.61 The 
realization of these plans will help Russia to increase its influence in Central 
Asia by gaining control over the Naryn, one of the most geostrategically im-
portant cross-border rivers in the region. Similar perspectives also appear for 
the long-discussed Rogun HPP in the case that Tajikistan, following the posi-
tive conclusion in September 2014 of the World Bank’s final assessment re-
port on the plant’s construction, finds itself unable to fund the project with-
out Russia’s participation and if Moscow subsequently resumes its promises 
in regard to contributing to its construction.
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Russian transport infrastructure initiatives in the region are similarly 
aimed at by-passing Uzbekistan and thus ensuring the independence of its 
Central Asian allies by avoiding transit through Uzbekistani territory. Tajiki-
stan is the most dependent country because all of its railroad lines to other 
countries run through Uzbekistan. The railroad connecting Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan has remained inoperative since November 2011 (reportedly) due to
an explosion on a railway bridge near the border of both states; as a conse-
quence, the southern regions of Tajikistan have become cut off from the Cen-
tral Asian main line. In response to these developments, Russia and its allies 
in the region have developed a project that can undermine the Uzbekistani 
role as the main railroad hub of Central Asia. In March 2013, Turkmenistan, 
Afghanistan and Tajikistan signed a memorandum on the construction of a
railway connecting the three countries. It is planned that the Afghan and Ta-
jik parts of the railway will be financed under the CAREC (Central Asia Re-
gional Economic Cooperation) programs. In September 2013, the Russian 
delegation at a meeting of Joint CAREC Transport Sector Coordinating and 
Customs Cooperation Committees proposed to connect the project with the 
Russia-Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan railroad construction plans dis-
cussed at an informal meeting of the CSTO heads of states earlier in May.62
The combination of the two projects would provide not only Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan, but also Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan with better ac-
cess to Afghanistan and, potentially, South Asia. For Tajikistan this would 
mean breaking the transport blockade, and it would also undermine Uzbeki-
stan’s advantageous position in the region.
The dissociation of Uzbekistan from the Eurasian integration projects
and regional initiatives would lead to a significant degree of isolation of this 
state from the economies of the ex-Soviet republics and also sever trade rela-
tions with Russia. The government in Tashkent would lose its non-military 
mechanisms of influence on Bishkek and Dushanbe. It goes without saying 
that such a scenario is not conducive to the Uzbekistani strategic path of as-
piring to being a regional leader. Tashkent thus faces a dilemma that requires 
performing new balancing feats on the “strategic wire” in order to prevent 
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negative developments and to remain an independent leader of Central Asia. 
Concerns over its increasingly difficult position perhaps were in the back-
ground when the Acting Head of Freight and Commercial Operation of Uz-
bekistan Railroads, Utkur Astanov, in July 2014 announced that the Uzbeki-
stani side had decided to launch Tajikistan’s transit transportation on a new 
line.63 Easing relations with neighbors is also essential for maintaining stabil-
ity at the borders in the situation of Afghanistan’s uncertain future and 
changing geopolitical conjunctures.
Conclusion: The Risks Involved in Uzbekistan’s Game of 
Chance
The long-term goal of achieving “eternal independence” declared by Uzbeki-
stan is an important element of the project of nationalizing state identity. This 
makes the foreign policy of Tashkent different from the policies of Kazakh-
stan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In those countries, the well-established set 
of security, political and economic links with Moscow significantly limits the 
maneuvering room in relations with other countries. Striving to be as inde-
pendent as possible in its foreign policy, Uzbekistan performs a balancing act 
in its relationships with international actors. Proceeding from the interpreta-
tions of the changing external and internal dynamics, this act entails a simul-
taneous reduction and enhancement of one direction or the other. Any radical 
changes in the regional and domestic security environment have an impact as 
“shock points” or “explosions” that send out waves leading to the oscillation 
of the “wire” upon which Uzbekistani strategic goals are strung. In tune with 
such oscillations, the country’s foreign policy inclines in those directions and 
can thus provide immediate support for state security. However, when the 
explosive wave calms and the security environment stabilizes, and the “wire” 
settles into a state of gradual motion, Uzbekistani policy subsequently returns 
to its strategic balancing act. Eventually, in Uzbekistan’s game of chance, 
maintaining a balance depends on how successfully the opportunities and 
risks inherent in the changing environment are met.
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By pursuing its desire to be an independent Central Asian leader, Tash-
kent plays a risky game that affects developments in the region. Since this 
policy is based on contraposition rather than complementing the external di-
rections, the Uzbekistani gamble is fraught with increasing confrontation 
between the country’s foreign partners, who try to anchor their presence and 
influence in Central Asia by counterbalancing the policies of each other and 
design their regional strategies correspondingly. Because external and inter-
nal developments are connected to each other, this political environment also 
threatens the domestic situation in Uzbekistan. The radicalization of the op-
position and the problematic areas in the Ferghana Valley, Karakalpakstan 
and the Tajik-populated territories, in addition to the uncertainty related to 
the upcoming transfer of presidential power, can foster the fragmentation of
state organization. If the political elite in Tashkent loses its grip on domestic 
affairs, the risk of major internal crises will increase. In this situation, both 
the states engaged in the region’s politics as well as transborder groups of 
insurgents will try to gain a stake in the redistribution of political power in 
Uzbekistan for their own benefit, which again will accelerate confrontation 
between the foreign actors.
Any instability arising in the Central Asian states can undermine Rus-
sia’s influence in the region and prompt its proactive foreign policy measures 
in the security sphere, including the use of military force in accordance with 
the commitments in the framework of the CSTO and bilateral agreements. To 
secure its regional presence Moscow tries to engage Tashkent in the Eurasian 
integration processes, but such efforts have thus far not been successful. For 
this reason the integration projects have been redirected to make a detour 
around Uzbekistan. Currently, the intensification of Russian political, eco-
nomic and military ties with the Central Asian CSTO members and the sim-
ultaneous dissociation of Uzbekistan from regional economic arrangements 
are the points of departure for Moscow’s policy toward Tashkent, which 
aims to persuade the Uzbekistani government to participate in Eurasian inte-
gration. However, the leadership in Tashkent perceives close engagement 
with the emerging Eurasian Union as a threat to national independence and 
its right to rule the state.
As the country’s participation in the CSTO shows, Uzbekistan with its 
high level of vertical integration is incapable of making compromises in mul-
tilateral frames of cooperation. In the Central Asian states any initiative for 
the delegation of authority to supra-national institutions encounters uncom-
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promising perceptions of sovereignty. Additionally, mutual distrust between 
these states amplifies contrasting opinions over security-related issues. Secu-
rity is strongly associated with the survival of personified regimes in these 
countries, and a collectivistic approach has little chance of developing due to 
divergent views on common threats. Political organization in Uzbekistan, 
which is centered upon the leader, President Karimov, makes it difficult for 
Tashkent to accept a multilateral regional institution led by another and more 
powerful state. By contrast, the Uzbekistani leadership feels more comforta-
ble in bilateral contacts: in such cases there is no need to coordinate political 
agenda with a number of different actors and no risk of finding one’s own 
position marginalized by a group of associated states with concordant opin-
ions. Moreover, bilateral relations provide the possibility of informal ar-
rangements that suit Uzbekistan’s balancing act amidst extra-regional pow-
ers. In bilateral cooperation, Tashkent is able to demand “equal rights” treat-
ment from powerful foreign partners. At the same time bilateral agreements 
are easier to break than those adopted in multilateral formats.
The policy choices made by Russia, which are aimed at depriving Uz-
bekistan of its tools of influence over its neighbors, affect the present struc-
ture of state borders in Central Asia. Russian initiatives for regional energy 
and transport projects that by-pass Uzbekistan, and its plans for military sup-
plies to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, strengthen the relative positions of Bish-
kek and Dushanbe in border disputes with Tashkent. The implementation of 
these initiatives can also reshape the Central Asian borderlands in those areas 
through which the routes of Uzbekistan’s economic interaction with Kazakh-
stan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan traditionally run. The aggravation of Uzbeki-
stan’s relations with its neighbors perhaps can be alleviated by means of the 
joint efforts of extra-regional actors focused on regional development and 
linked with such initiatives as the “New Silk Roads” proposed by the U.S. 
and China, as well as the projects within Eurasian integration promoted by 
Russia and Kazakhstan.
Since independence the Uzbekistani leadership has attempted to rely on 
its own sources of power for resolving domestic problems, while the protec-
tion of the Afghan border, both official and “secondary,” has required sup-
port from international actors. The reorganization of the foreign military 
presence and the change of power in Afghanistan drives the government of 
Uzbekistan to active negotiations regarding security guarantees with its for-
eign partners. In this process, two security systems are in competition with 
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each other: the Russian-led CSTO and the U.S.-led NATO. In the field of
security, the EU does not have much to offer Uzbekistan separately from the 
U.S. and NATO, and its emphasis on good governance, human rights and, 
more generally, democratization is counterproductive to building relations 
with the independent-minded ruling elite in Tashkent. The structure of secu-
rity guarantees provided by Washington is flexible because it is based mostly 
on rather vague political declarations. The security interaction between Mos-
cow and Tashkent has a solid foundation with legally binding security guar-
antees that are enshrined in numerous agreements on military cooperation 
between the two states, and above all, in the Treaty of Alliance.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that Uzbekistan favors a more pro-
Russian direction that would eventually mean drawing the country into the 
deeper political integration within the developing Eurasian association. To 
avoid this scenario Tashkent has shifted from the format of collective securi-
ty cooperation to a bilateral alliance with Russia. The Uzbek “task of the 
day” is to bargain for such security guarantees which involve minimum inter-
ference of an external authority in decision-making concerning issues within 
the political boundaries of the country; boundaries relating to both domestic 
politics and interaction with international actors. The balancing act of Uzbek-
istan implies the diversification of foreign policy directions in order to ensure 
security on its path towards “eternal independence.” However, this game of 
chance also entails the continuous risk that the path could result in a loss of 
the positions that this state aspires to in regional political and economic af-
fairs; and this risk is growing due to the increasingly tense relations between 
the rival security arrangements of Russia and the U.S. in the region.
